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Showing	  and	  Saying	  
An	  Aesthetic	  Difference	  
Vicente	  Sanfélix	  Vidarte	  
1.	  In	  a	  letter	  Wittgenstein	  wrote	  to	  Russell	  from	  Cassino,	  where	  he	  was	  imprisoned,	  he	  
says	  regarding	  his	  book,	  the	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus:	  
Now	   I’m	   afraid	   you	   haven’t	   really	   got	   hold	   of	   my	   main	   contention,	   to	   which	   the	   whole	  
business	  of	  logical	  prop(osition)	  is	  only	  a	  corollary.	  The	  main	  point	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  what	  can	  
be	  expressed	  (gesagt)	  by	  prop(osition)s	  –	  i.e.	  by	  language	  –	  (and,	  which	  come	  to	  the	  same,	  
what	   can	   be	   thought)	   and	   what	   cannot	   be	   expressed	   by	   prop(osition)s,	   but	   only	   shown	  
(gezeigt);	  which,	  I	  believe,	  is	  the	  cardinal	  problem	  of	  philosophy	  (Wittgenstein,	  [1997]	  124)1	  	  
This	   text	   proves	   that	   for	  Wittgenstein	   the	   distinction	   between	   saying	   and	   showing	  
and	  the	  critical	  thesis	  –	  since	  it	  marks	  a	  limit	  –	  associated	  with	  it	  –	  this	   is,	  what	  can	  be	  
shown	  cannot	  be	  said	  –	  was	  crucial	  to	  understand	  his	  first	  philosophy.	  
But,	  just	  for	  his	  first	  philosophy?	  There	  are	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  the	  distinction	  and	  
the	   thesis,	   although	   formulated	   in	   other	   terms,	   persist	   throughout	   the	   evolution	   of	  
Wittgenstein's	  thought.	  For	  example,	  in	  paragraph	  501	  of	  On	  Certainty,	  work	  in	  which	  he	  
endeavored	   until	   two	   days	   before	   his	   death,	   we	   see	   how	   he	   asks	   himself:	   «Am	   I	   not	  
getting	   closer	   and	   closer	   to	   saying	   that	   in	   the	   end	   logic	   cannot	   be	   described	  
[beschreiben]?	   You	  must	   look	   at	   the	   practice	   of	   language;	   then	   you	   will	   see	   it».	   This	  
means	   that	   for	   the	   latest	  Wittgenstein	   there	   is	   also	   something	   that	   cannot	   be	   said	   –	  
described	  –	  but	  can	  be	  shown	  –	  seen.	  
Moreover,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   distinction	   between	   showing	   and	   saying	   and	  
the	  associated	  critical	  thesis	  that	  goes	  with	  it,	  what	  can	  be	  shown	  cannot	  be	  said,	  play	  a	  
key	   role	   in	  understanding	   the	  Wittgensteinian	  point	  of	   view	  on	  aesthetics.	   In	   the	  only	  
entry	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  in	  which	  it	  is	  mentioned,	  6.421,	  it	  says:	  «It	  is	  
clear	  that	  ethics	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  [aussprechen].	  Ethics	  is	  transcendental.	  Ethics	  and	  
 
1	  Letter	  to	  Russell	  August	  18th,	  1919.	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aesthetics	  are	  one».	  
And	  in	  paragraph	  20	  of	  the	  first	  part	  of	  his	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics	  it	  can	  be	  read:	  «It	  is	  
not	  only	  difficult	   to	  describe	  what	  appreciation	  (aesthetics)	  consists	   in,	  but	   impossible.	  
To	  describe	  what	  it	  consists	  in	  we	  would	  have	  to	  describe	  the	  whole	  environment».	  
Our	  aim	  here	  is,	  first,	  to	  clarify	  the	  distinction	  and	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  associated	  
critical	   thesis	   that	   go	  with	   it	   and	   secondly,	   to	   see	  what	   the	   implications	   are	  when	  we	  
apply	  it	  to	  the	  aesthetic	  realm.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2.	  Much	  has	  been	  discussed	  about	  the	  sources	  from	  which	  Wittgenstein	  could	  drink	  to	  
come	   to	   formulate	   the	  distinction	  between	   to	   show	  and	   to	   say	  and	  his	   thesis	  of	  what	  
can	  be	  shown	  cannot	  be	  said.	  For	  some	  people,	  Wittgenstein	  could	  be	   inspired	  on	  this	  
point	  by	  Frege,	   for	  others	  by	  Tolstoy.	  Other	  names	  could	  be	  mentioned	  such	  as	  Hertz,	  
Weininger	   or	   even	   Mauthner.	   We	   will	   not	   go	   in	   search	   of	   historical	   causes	   –	   highly	  
problematic,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  gave	  no	  clue	  about	  it.	  What	  we	  can	  know	  for	  sure	  is	  when	  
it	  made	  its	  first	  appearance	  in	  his	  writings	  and	  in	  what	  context.	  It	  appears	  in	  The	  notes	  
dictated	  to	  Moore	  in	  Norway,	  from	  March	  29th	  to	  April	  14th,	  1914.	  In	  the	  first	  observation	  
they	   gather	   reads:	   «Logical	   so-­‐called	   propositions	   show	   (the)	   logical	   properties	   of	  
language	  and	  therefore	  of	  (the)	  Universe,	  but	  say	  nothing».	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  distinction	  between	  show	  and	  say	  is	  introduced	  for	  the	  first	  time	  
in	   the	  writings	   of	  Wittgenstein	   to	   address	   an	   issue	   related	   to	   the	   philosophy	   of	   logic,	  
namely:	  the	  statute	  of	  its	  propositions.	  
It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  understand	  why	  logical	  propositions	  say	  nothing.	  They	  say	  nothing	  
because	  they	  are	  tautologies,	  this	  means	  logically	  necessary	  truths,	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  
describe	  any	  contingent	   fact	   that	  may	  occur	   in	   the	  world.	   If	  we	  say	  “it's	   raining	  or	  not	  
raining”	  we	  are	  not	  saying	  anything	  about	  the	  weather.	  
However,	   Wittgenstein	   states,	   these	   propositions	   do	   show	   something:	   the	   logical	  
properties	  of	  language,	  and	  therefore	  of	  the	  universe	  that	  it	  describes.	  Tautologies	  show	  
them	  because	  just	  from	  looking	  at	  them,	  those	  properties	  can	  be	  seen.	  We	  look	  at	  the	  
logical	  proposition	  “(p)	  p	  v	  ~	  p”	  and	  we	  immediately	  see	  that	  our	  language	  has	  the	  logic	  
property	   that	  every	  proposition	  with	   sense	  can	  be	  affirmed	  or	  denied	   in	   it	   (language);	  
which	   is	   to	   say,	  we	   see	   that	   the	  universe	  has	   the	   logical	  property	   that	  any	   contingent	  
fact	   described	   by	   a	  meaningful	   proposition	   can	   occur	   or	   not	   in	   it.	   And	   to	   see	   this,	   to	  
“know	  it”,	  we	  don’t	  have	  to	  look	  at	  the	  world	  unless	  we	  want	  to	  know	  strictly	  whether	  
the	  world	  actually	  has	  the	  property	  that	  the	  fact	  described	  by	  a	  meaningful	  proposition	  
occurs	   or	   not	   in	   it;	   for	   example,	   to	   know	   that	   it	   rains	   is	   the	   case	   indeed,	   as	   the	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proposition	  “it	  rains”	  says	  that	  it	  occurs.	  
So	  we	  have	  a	   first	   type	  of	  propositions,	  although	   it	  would	  be	  better	   to	  say	  pseudo-­‐
propositions,	   which	   say	   nothing	   but	   do	   show.	   They	   are	   the	   “propositions”	   of	   logic:	  
tautologies	   (and	   its	   negation:	   the	   contradictions).	   They	   enunciate	   truths	   (or	   untruths)	  
logically	   necessary	   which	   show	   the	   logical	   properties	   of	   language	   and	   of	   the	  world	   it	  
describes.	  Wittgenstein	  will	  call	  this	  type	  of	  propositions	  “senseless”.	  
But	   meaningful	   propositions,	   propositions	   that	   do	   say	   something,	   also	   show.	   The	  
proposition	  “it	  rains”	  says	  the	  situation	  it	  describes	  is	  the	  case,	  what	  can	  be	  true	  or	  false;	  
and	  shows,	  regardless	  its	  particular	  value	  of	  truth,	  this	  is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  making	  sense,	  a	  
logical	   property	   of	   the	   world,	   as	   well	   as	   logical	   propositions.	   In	   this	   case,	   that	   in	   our	  
world	  the	  rain	  is	  a	  possibility.	  
We	   now	   have	   a	   second	   type	   of	   propositions.	   They	   are	  meaningful	   propositions	   or	  
sensible.	  Authentic	  propositions,	  “real	  propositions”.	  Propositions	  that	  do	  both,	  say	  and	  
show.	   They	   say	   that	   the	   situations	   they	   describe	   are	   the	   case.	   And	   they	   show	   that	  
situations	  they	  describe	  are	  a	  logical	  possibility	  of	  our	  world.	  
From	  here	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  the	  critical	  thesis	  of	  Wittgenstein.	  The	  sense	  that	  
meaningful	  propositions	  show	  cannot	  be	  said.	  If	  we	  try	  to	  do	  it,	  we	  immediately	  slide	  to	  
the	  field	  of	  nonsense.	  A	  meteorologist	  who	  said	  “it	  rains”	  without	  specifying	  the	  date	  or	  
place	  of	  the	  rain,	  this	  is	  that	  he	  only	  wants	  to	  inform	  us	  of	  the	  logical	  possibility	  of	  rain	  
(i.e.:	  the	  possibility	  of	  rain	  in	  the	  past,	  present	  and	  future,	  at	  any	  time	  and	  in	  any	  place)	  
tells	  us	  so	  little	  about	  the	  actual	  weather	  like	  someone	  who	  just	  say	  “it's	  raining	  or	   it’s	  
not	  raining”.	  The	  attempt	  to	  say	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  sensible	  proposition	  shows	  becomes	  a	  
nonsensical	   (Unsinn),	   which	   is	   not	   strictly	   a	   tautology,	   but	   something	   as	   necessarily	  
“true”	  as	  tautologies.	  
The	  attempt	  to	  say	  the	  sense	  that	  sensible	  propositions	  show	  generates	  then,	  a	  third	  
type	  of	  propositions	  or,	  to	  be	  more	  stringent,	  a	  second	  type	  of	  pseudo-­‐propositions	  to	  
add	   to	   the	   logical	   “propositions”.	  These	  are	   the	  nonsensical.	   Like	   tautologies,	   they	  say	  
nothing	   because	   the	   “truth”	   they	   herald	   is	   necessary.	   But	   like	   them	   and	   meaningful	  
propositions,	  which	  are	  similar	  in	  their	  syntactic	  form,	  do	  show	  something;	  namely:	  once	  
more,	   logical	   properties	   of	   our	   language	   /	  world.	   Hence,	   they	   are	   to	  meet,	   in	   certain	  
contexts,	  an	  elucidative	  function.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  try	  to	  teach	  someone	  the	  meaning	  
of	  a	  term	  –	  “this	  is	  a	  hand”	  –	  (Cfr.	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus,	  3.263)2	  ...	  or	  more	  generally	  if	  
we	  try	  to	  give	  a	  class	  of	  ontology	  –	  «The	  world	  is	  everything	  that	  is	  the	  case	  ...	  it	  is	  the	  
 
2	  From	  now	  on	  T	  with	  the	  proposition	  number.	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totality	  of	  facts,	  not	  of	  things»	  (T,	  1,	  1.1).	  
It	   is	   very	   important,	   I	  would	   say	   essential	   since	   it	   is	   an	   unusual	   habit,	   noticing	   the	  
proximity	   between	   the	   propositions	   of	   logic,	   tautologies,	   and	   this	   type	   of	   nonsensical	  
propositions.	   In	   a	   way,	   we	   could	   say	   that	   they	   are	   crypto-­‐tautologies.	   Behind	   the	  
syntactic	   or	   grammatical	   appearance	   of	   the	  meaningful	   propositions,	   there	   is	   nothing	  
hidden,	  but	  a	  logical	  need,	  a	  tautological	  truth.	  	  
	  
3.	  What	   is	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  show	  and	  say	  and	  the	  critical	  thesis	  
that	  what	  can	  be	  shown	  cannot	  be	  said	   in	  the	  aesthetics	  realm?	  In	  a	   letter	  dated	  April	  
9th,	  1917	  addressed	  to	  Paul	  Engelmann,	  Wittgenstein	  expresses	  his	  enthusiasm	  with	  a	  
poem	  by	  Ludwig	  Uhland	  –	  Count	  Eberhard's	  Hawthorn	  (cfr.	  Appendix	  1)	  –	  he	  had	  sent	  to	  
him:	  «The	  poem	  by	  Uhland	  is	  really	  magnificent»	  he	  states	  (Engelmann	  [1967]:	  7).	  
Some	  commentators	  have	  not	  shared	  this	  Wittgensteinian	  enthusiasm,	  but	  the	  point	  
here	  is	  not	  so	  much	  attune	  or	  discrepancy	  to	  our	  taste	  with	  the	  young	  Wittgenstein’s,	  as	  
to	  understand	  that	  most	   likely	  his	  esteem	  for	  the	  poem	  of	  Uhland	  was	  due	  to	  see	  in	   it	  
the	  realization	  of	  the	  qualities	  that,	  in	  his	  view,	  a	  work	  of	  art	  had	  to	  meet.	  
Indeed,	   in	   justification	   of	   his	   judgment,	   and	   corroborating	   something	   Engelmann	  
himself	   had	   already	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   letter	   in	   which	   he	   transcribed	   the	   poem	   of	  
Uhland,	   Wittgenstein	   says:	   «And	   this	   is	   how	   it	   is:	   if	   only	   you	   do	   not	   try	   to	   utter	  
[auszusprechen]	  what	   is	  unutterable	   [Unaussprechliche],	   the	  nothing	  gets	   lost.	  But	   the	  
unutterable	   will	   be	   –	   unutterably	   [unaussprechlich]	   –	   contained	   in	   what	   has	   been	  
uttered	  [Ausgesprochenen]!»	  (ibid.).	  
We	  quoted	  earlier	  observation	  6.421	  of	   the	  Tractatus	   in	  which,	  after	  asserting	   that	  
ethics	   cannot	  be	  expressed,	  Wittgenstein	   identified	   it	  with	   the	  aesthetics	  and	  now	  we	  
see	  the	  merit	  of	  the	  poem	  by	  Uhland,	  in	  his	  view,	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  utter	  the	  
unutterable	  but	  this	  is,	  in	  some	  way,	  contained	  in	  what	  has	  been	  uttered.	  
Perhaps,	   this	   could	   be	   generalized.	   According	   to	  Wittgenstein,	   the	   objective	   of	   the	  
work	  of	  art	  should	  be	  giving	  us	  access	  somehow	  to	  the	  area	  of	  the	  unutterable,	  of	  what,	  
to	   put	   it	   with	   Tractatus	   6.522,	   shows	   itself	   (“zeigt	   sich”),	   that	   is:	   the	   mystical.	  
Incidentally,	  an	  aim	  that	  would	  be	  subscribed	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  so	  called	  by	  many	  in	  
Spain,	   tradition	   of	   metaphysical	   or	   meditative	   poetry;	   and	   a	   Wittgenstein’s	   aesthetic	  
thesis	   that	   would	   not	   be	   difficult	   to	   relate	   to	   some	   of	   his	   most	   characteristic	  
philosophical	  strategies,	  for	  example:	  his	  criticism	  to	  Russell’s	  theory	  of	  types.	  
Indeed,	  facing	  Russell’s	  aspirations	  to	  construct	  a	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  tell	  us	  the	  logical	  
type	   each	   of	   the	   expressions	   we	   use	   in	   our	   language	   belongs	   to,	   and	   explicit	   which	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symbolic	   combinations	  are	   legitimate	  and	  which	  are	  not,	   the	  proposal	  of	  Wittgenstein	  
was	   to	  design	  a	  notation	   that	   immediately	  show	  all	   this,	  namely:	  both	   the	   logical	   type	  
that	   each	   expression	   exemplifies	   and	   the	   symbolic	   combinations	   that	   may	   occur	  
between	   the	   different	   types	   of	   terms.	   In	   short:	   replace	   the	   nonsense,	   in	   which	   the	  
propositions	  of	  Russell's	  theory	  incurs	  necessarily	  by	  trying	  to	  say	  what	  cannot	  be	  said,	  
by	   perfectly	  meaningful	   propositions	   that	   show	  what	   this	   theory	   sought	   to	   express	   in	  
vain.	   This	   is	   a	   strategy	  we	  might	  well	   call	   hertzian,	  which	   ultimately	   ends	   up	   defining	  
what	   according	   to	   the	   young	   Wittgenstein	   should	   be	   the	   only	   correct	   method	   in	  
philosophy	  (Cfr.	  T,	  6.53).	  
Well,	  similarly,	  although	  the	  artwork	  has	  the	  objective	  to	  show	  the	  inexpressible,	  the	  
mystical,	   it	   should	   use	   the	   second	   of	   the	   three	   types	   of	   propositions	   that	   we	   noted	  
above,	  i.e.:	  “real”	  propositions,	  perfectly	  meaningful.	  As	  the	  poem	  by	  Uhland	  does	  –	  and	  
the	  advocates	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  poetry	  recommend.	  
Engelmann,	   certainly	   at	   this	   time	   in	   perfect	   ethical-­‐aesthetic	   harmony	   with	  
Wittgenstein,	   clearly	   states:	  «Each	  one	  of	  Uhland's	  verses	  was	   simple	  –	  not	   ingenious,	  
but	   tersely	   informative»	   (Engelmann	   [1967]:	  84).	   («Each	  of	   these	  verses	  was	   simple	   in	  
itself,	  neither	  “simple”	  but	  “objective”»,	  ivi,	  Spanish	  edition,	  p.	  137).	  
But	  if	  the	  integral	  verses	  of	  a	  poem	  are,	  considered	  in	  isolation,	  perfectly	  meaningful	  
propositions,	   informative,	   objective	   (in	   the	   letter	   in	  which	   Engelmann	   transcribed	   the	  
poem	  to	  Wittgenstein	  said	  «It	  is	  a	  marvel	  of	  objectivity»	  [ivi,	  31]),	  that	  say	  what	  can	  be	  
said,	   then	  how	  can	   the	  poem	  show	  the	  unutterable?	  And	  even	  more,	  what	  would	   the	  
unutterable	  be?	  Engelmann	  gives	  us	  an	  answer	  to	  both	  questions:	  «the	  poem	  as	  a	  whole	  
gives	  [...]	  the	  picture	  of	  a	  life»	  (ivi,	  85).	  
That	   is,	   what	   single	   verses	   do	   not	   do,	   when	   taken	   together	   they	   do.	   The	   showing	  
function,	  we	  might	   say,	   is	  a	  Gestalt	  quality	  of	   the	  poem;	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	   the	  
poem	   taken	   as	   a	   whole.	   We	   should	   not	   be	   surprised.	   Tautologies	   have	   the	   same	  
property.	   They	   are	   also	   composed	   of	   perfectly	   meaningful	   propositions,	   “objective”,	  
“real”,	   they	   say	   something	   –	   namely:	   the	   situation	   they	  describe	   is	   the	   case.	  And	   yet,	  
their	   combination	   does	   not	   say	   anything	   ...	   although	   they	   show	   something	   –	   logical	  
properties	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  we	  already	  know.	  And	  if	  anyone	  is	  tempted	  to	  think	  that	  this	  
comparison	  is	   inappropriate,	  would	  do	  better	  to	  notice	  what	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  in	  his	  
Notebooks	  on	  March	  4th,	  1915:	  «A	  tune	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  tautology,	  it	  is	  complete	  in	  itself,	  it	  
satisfies	   itself»;	   as	   previously,	   on	   February	   7th	   of	   that	   year,	   he	   had	  written:	   «Musical	  
themes	  are	  in	  certain	  sense	  propositions».	  
Obviously,	   the	   whole	   of	   a	   poem,	   or	   a	   novel,	   do	   not	   make	   a	   tautology	   up	   strictly	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speaking,	  so	  we	  should	  rather	  say	  that	  what	  they	  make	  up	  is	  analogous	  to	  that	  third	  type	  
of	   propositions	   previously	   mentioned:	   those	   nonsensical,	   (unsinnig)	   propositions	   that	  
said	  nothing	  but	  showed	  something	  as	  necessary	  as	  what	  tautologies	  show	  in	  the	  strict	  
sense	   and	   that,	   please	   recall,	   could	   have	   an	   elucidative	   function,	   either	   in	   language	  
learning	  or	  in	  the	  philosophical	  task	  itself	  (which,	  incidentally,	  would	  have	  as	  a	  corollary	  
that	   for	   the	   young	   Wittgenstein,	   the	   statute	   of	   philosophy	   would	   be	   close	   to	   the	  
artwork’s).	  
But	   from	  Engelmann	   statements	   regarding	  Uhland's	  poem	  not	  only	   can	  we	  deduce	  
something	  about	  the	  logical	  status	  that	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein	  would	  correspond	  to	  
the	  artwork’s	  –	  as	  a	  whole,	  a	  nonsense	  similar	  to	  a	  tautology;	  even	  though	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
a	   literary	   work,	   all	   phrases	   or	   verses	   in	   isolation,	   may	   be	   perfectly	   meaningful	  
propositions	  –	  but	  also	  about	  what	   the	  artwork	   shows	  unsaid.	  Recall:	  The	  picture	  of	  a	  
life.	  
One	  might	  think	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  would	  be	  Engelmann’s	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  
it	  would	  not	  have	  to	  be	  Wittgenstein’s	  view;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  would	  be	  the	  
case	  for	  the	  poem	  of	  Uhland,	  and	  perhaps	  for	  other	  similar	  poems	  or	  works	  of	  art,	  but	  
not	   for	   the	   work	   of	   art	   in	   general.	   However,	   some	   observations	   of	  Wittgenstein	   give	  
pause	   for	   thought.	  For	  example,	  we	  read	   in	   the	  entry	  of	  August	  1st,	  1916:	  «Only	   from	  
the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  my	  life	  arises	  religion	  –	  science	  –	  and	  art».	  (But,	  
is	   it	  not	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   the	   life	  of	  Count	  Eberhard	  –	  a	  crusader	   in	  holy	   land	  –	  what	  
Uhland's	  poem	  show?).	  And	  yet	  in	  an	  observation	  of	  August	  22nd,	  1930,	  gathered	  in	  the	  
aphorisms	  of	  Culture	  and	  Value,	  comes	  back	  to	  a	  similar	  idea:	  
Nothing	   could	   be	   more	   remarkable	   that	   seeing	   a	   man	   who	   thinks	   he	   is	   unobserved	  
performing	  some	  quite	  simple	  everyday	  activity.	  Let	  us	   imagine	  a	  theatre;	  the	  curtain	  goes	  
up	  and	  we	  see	  a	  man	  alone	  in	  a	  room,	  walking	  up	  and	  down,	  etc.	  so	  that	  suddenly	  we	  are	  
observing	   a	   human	   being	   from	   outside	   in	   a	   way	   that	   ordinarily	   we	   can	   never	   observe	  
ourselves;	  it	  would	  be	  like	  watching	  a	  chapter	  of	  biography	  with	  our	  own	  eyes,	  	  –	  surely	  this	  
would	   be	   uncanny	   and	   wonderful	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   We	   should	   be	   observing	   something	  
more	   wonderful	   than	   anything	   a	   playwright	   could	   arrange	   to	   be	   acted	   or	   spoken	   on	   the	  
stage:	  life	  itself.	  (Wittgenstein,	  1989:	  4e).	  
We	  said	  before,	  relying	  on	  Tractatus	  6.421	  and	  6.522,	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  work	  
of	   art	   is	   to	   show	   the	   unutterable,	   the	   mystical	   (“das	   Mystische”),	   but	   now	   we	   can	  
understand	   that	   the	  mystical	   does	   not	   need	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   a	   platonic	  way,	   as	   a	  
kind	  of	  parallel	  world.	  The	  mystic	  can	  be	  found	  in	  most	  every	  day	  activity,	  in	  any	  “quite	  
simple	   everyday	   activity”...	   in	   the	   same	  way,	   and	   not	   by	   chance	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   the	  
miraculous	  as	  Wittgenstein	  advocates	  in	  his	  Lecture	  on	  Ethics,	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  found	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in	   any	   extraordinary	   event.	   If	   this	   aesthetic	   theory	   initiates	   a	   dualism,	   it	   is	   not	   an	  
ontological	  dualism	  but	  of	  perspectives.	  The	   text	  of	  Culture	  and	  Value	   that	  we	  quoted	  
continues	  as	  it	  follows:	  
But	   then	  we	  do	  see	   this	  every	  day	  without	   its	  making	   the	  slightest	   impression	  on	  us!	  True	  
enough,	  but	  we	  do	  not	   see	   it	   from	   that	   point	  of	   view.	  –	  Well,	  when	  E(ngelmann)	   looks	  at	  
what	  he	  has	  written	  and	  finds	  it	  marvelous...	  he	  is	  seeing	  his	  life	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art	  created	  by	  
God	   and,	   as	   such,	   it	   is	   certainly	   worth	   contemplating,	   as	   is	   every	   life	   and	   everything	  
whatever.	  But	  only	  an	  artist	  can	  so	  represent	  an	  individual	  thing	  as	  to	  make	  it	  appear	  to	  us	  
like	   a	   work	   of	   art...	   A	   work	   of	   art	   forces	   us	   –	   as	   one	   might	   say	   –	   to	   see	   it	   in	   the	   right	  
perspective	  but,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  art,	   the	  object	   is	   just	  a	   fragment	  of	  nature	   like	  another	  
(Wittgenstein	  [1989]:	  4e)	  
When	  Wittgenstein	  said	  that	  art	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  
my	  life,	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  imply	  by	  this	  that	  all	  art	  had	  to	  be	  biographical	  in	  its	  theme.	  
The	  consciousness	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  my	  life	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	  another	  one	  without	  a	  loss	  cannot	  replace	  my	  life;	  everything	  that	  happens	  to	  me	  
and	  ultimately	  forms	  my	  world.	  Or,	  as	  he	  would	  express	   it	   in	  his	  Lecture	  on	  Ethics,	   it	   is	  
the	   consciousness	   that	  my	   life	   has	   an	   absolute	   value.	   So	  what	   art	   does,	   based	   on	   an	  
object	   most	   unnoticed	   that	   may	   be	   one	   with	   which	   we	   have	   the	   most	   common	  
treatment	  (think,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  pair	  of	  boots	  painted	  by	  Van	  Gogh),	  is	  to	  force	  us	  
notice	  its	  uniqueness	  and,	  thus,	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  our	  own	  experience	  
when	  we	  contemplate	  it:	  
As	   a	   thing	   among	   things,	   each	   thing	   is	   equally	   insignificant;	   as	   a	   world	   each	   one	   equally	  
significant.	  If	  I	  have	  been	  contemplating	  the	  stove,	  and	  then	  I	  am	  told:	  but	  now	  all	  you	  know	  
is	   the	   stove,	  my	   result	  does	   indeed	   seem	   trivial.	   For	   this	   represents	   the	  matter	   as	   if	   I	   had	  
studied	  the	  stove	  as	  one	  among	  the	  many	  things	  in	  the	  world.	  But	  if	  I	  was	  contemplating	  the	  
stove	  it	  was	  my	  world,	  and	  everything	  else	  colorless	  by	  contrast	  with	  it.	  (Notebooks,	  8.10.16)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
4.	  Wittgenstein	   calls	   this	   perspective	   in	   which	   art	   has	   installed	   us	   «sub	   specie	  
aeternitatis	  vision»,	  perspective	  whose	  adoption	  for	  the	  whole	  world	   is	  equivalent,	   for	  
Wittgenstein,	  to	  adopt	  an	  ethical	  attitude:	   	  
The	  work	  of	  art	  is	  the	  object	  seen	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis;	  and	  the	  good	  life	  is	  the	  world	  seen	  
sub	   specie	   aeternitatis.	   This	   is	   the	   connexion	   beetwen	   art	   and	   ethics.	   The	   usual	   way	   of	  
looking	   at	   things	   sees	   objects	   as	   it	   were	   from	   the	   midst	   of	   them,	   the	   view	   sub	   specie	  
aeternitatis	   from	   outside.	   In	   such	   a	   way	   that	   they	   have	   the	   world	   as	   background.	  
(Notebooks,	  7.10.16)	   	  
Since	   art	   presents	   objects	   and	   ethics	   the	   world	   sub	   specie	   aeternitatis,	   we	   might	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think	   that	   the	   latter	   includes	   aesthetics	   as	   one	   of	   its	   chapters.	   And	   sometimes,	  
Wittgenstein	  expresses	  himself	  in	  these	  terms	  («Now	  I	  am	  going	  to	  use	  the	  term	  Ethics	  
in	  a	  sense	  ...	  in	  fact	  which	  includes	  what	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  MOST	  essential	  part	  of	  what	  
is	  called	  Generally	  Aesthetics»	  he	  says	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  his	  Lecture	  on	  Ethics).	  But	  
if	  we	  reflect	  on	  a	  little,	  we	  could	  conclude	  a	  strict	  equivalence	  between	  both	  proclaimed	  
in	  the	  Tractatus,	  since	  we	  could	  also	  say	  that	  ethics	  is	  nothing	  but	  to	  look	  at	  the	  whole	  
world	   as	   a	  work	   of	   art:	   «Aesthetically,	   the	  miracle	   is	   that	   the	  world	   exists.	   That	  what	  
exists	  does	  exist.	   Is	   the	  essence	  of	  the	  artistic	  way	  of	   looking	  at	  things,	   that	   it	   looks	  at	  
the	  world	  with	  a	  happy	  eye?	  Life	  is	  serious,	  art	  is	  gay»	  (Notebooks,	  20.10.16).	  «For	  there	  
is	   certainly	   something	   in	   the	   conception	   that	   the	   end	   of	   art	   is	   the	   beautiful.	   And	   the	  
beautiful	  is	  what	  makes	  happy».	  
An	   entry	   that	  makes	   us	   notice	   that,	   in	   fact,	   the	   equivalence	   could	   be	   expanded	   to	  
include	  religion,	  because	  if	  ethics	  consists	  in	  looking	  at	  the	  world	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  it	  also	  
consists	   in	   looking	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  world	  as	  a	  miracle	  («What	   is	  good	  is	  also	  divine.	  
Queer	  as	  it	  sounds,	  that	  sums	  up	  my	  ethics»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1989]:	  3e).	  
Moreover,	   if	   the	  art	  comes	   from	  the	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis	   view	  of	  objects	  we	  can	  
understand	  that	  what	  the	  artist	  is	  looking	  for	  with	  his	  work	  is	  to	  give	  expression	  to	  that	  
experience:	  «Art	   is	  a	  kind	  of	  expression.	  Good	  art	   is	  complete	  [vollendete]	  expression»	  
(Notebooks,	  19.9.16).	  
That	  is,	  when	  the	  art	  is	  good	  is	  a	  perfect	  expression.	  So	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  can	  be	  
added	  or	  subtracted	  to	  the	  work,	  nor	  change	  it,	  without	  making	  it	  worse.	  In	  those	  rare	  
and	  happy	  cases,	  we	  might	  say,	  the	  work	  is	  really	  like	  a	  tautology,	  because	  we	  could	  not	  
modify	  any	  of	  its	  components	  while	  being	  (in	  “(p)	  p	  v	  ~	  p”	  we	  could	  not	  replace	  “p”	  by	  
“q”	  not	  even	  when	  “q”	  would	  have	  the	  same	  truth	  value	  as	  “p”;	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  would	  not	  
have	  a	  tautology	  anymore).	  Therefore,	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  the	  work	  of	  art	  seeks	  
to	  show	  the	  ineffable,	  what	   it	  utters	   is	  absolutely	  essential	  to	   it.	  And	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
day,	  if	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  the	  uniqueness,	  the	  absolute	  value,	  the	  expression	  that	  shows	  
it	   should	   be	   equally	   valuable,	   unique,	   irreplaceable.	   In	   his	   opinion,	   Engelmann	  
expounded:	  
What	   I	   have	   learned	   before	   as	   a	   reader	   of	   Karl	   Kraus	  was	   here	   for	   the	   first	   time	   brought	  
home	  to	  me	  by	  direct	  experience:	  the	  fact	  of	  poetry	  can	  produce	  a	  profound	  artistic	  effect	  
beyond	   (but	  never	  without)	   the	   immediate	  effect	  of	   its	   language.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   it	  needs	  a	  
rare	  and	  felicitous	  conjuncture	  to	  bring	  off	  that	  effect.	  (Engelmann	  [1967]:	  84)	  
If	  the	  work	  of	  art	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  vision	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  vision,	  so	  
to	   speak,	   that	   contemplates	   the	  world	  and	   its	  objects	  as	   from	  above	  –	  «[...]	   capturing	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the	  world	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis	  [...]	  it	  is	  as	  though	  it	  flies	  above	  the	  world	  and	  leaves	  it	  
as	  it	  is	  –	  observing	  it	  from	  above,	  in	  flight»	  –	  the	  work	  of	  art	  is	  not	  a	  ladder	  we	  can	  throw	  
away	  once	  that	  vision	  has	  been	  achieved.	  
A	  final	  consequence	  of	  this	  understanding	  of	  art,	  about	  which	   little	  will	  be	  required	  
to	   stress	   here,	   is	   the	   irreducibility	   of	   the	   aesthetic	   to	   the	   scientific	   perspective.	  
Wittgenstein	   explicitly	   underlines	   it	   in	   his	   Lecture	   on	   Ethics:	   «[...]	   the	   scientific	  way	  of	  
looking	  at	  a	  fact	  is	  not	  the	  way	  to	  look	  at	  it	  as	  a	  miracle	  [...]».	  (But	  we	  already	  know	  that	  
the	  aesthetic	  perspective	  makes	  us	  look	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  object,	  or	  the	  world	  itself,	  
as	  miraculous).	  «[...]	  Ethics	  so	  far	  as	  it	  spring	  from	  the	  desire	  to	  say	  something	  about	  [...]	  
the	   absolute	   valuable,	   can	  be	  no	   science».	   (But	  we	  also	   know	  by	  now	   that	   ethics	   and	  
aesthetics	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing).	  
It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  understand	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  impossibility.	  Science	  moves	  in	  the	  
same	  area	   than	   the	  meaningful	  propositions.	   Its	   goal	   is	   to	  be	  able	   to	   say	  what	   can	  be	  
said,	   to	   formulate	   the	   laws	   governing	   the	   occurrence	   of	   events.	   Installed	   in	   this	  
perspective,	  we	  can	  be	   interested	   in	  the	  phenomena	  whereas	  exemplification	  of	  these	  
laws	  (or	  objects	  as	  examples	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  thing).	  That	  is,	  interested	  in	  what	  makes	  them	  
typical	   instead	   of	   singular.	   So,	   in	   the	   world	   described	   by	   science,	   everything	   has	   the	  
same	  value.	  Or	  at	  best,	  everything	  can	  only	  have	  a	  different	  relative	  value.	  If	  p	  is	  sought,	  
then	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  get	  it	  is	  q.	  To	  face	  science,	  aesthetics	  (and	  ethics)	  aims	  to	  show	  an	  
absolute	   value	   of	   things	   (or	   the	   world),	   as	   necessary	   as	   it	   may	   be	   the	   truth	   of	   a	  
tautology,	  using	  a	  work	  which,	  although	  it	  may	  be	  built	  with	  meaningful	  propositions,	  as	  
a	  whole	  is	  nonsensical.	  And	  that	  is	  because	  its	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  what	  cannot	  be	  said,	  the	  
ineffable,	  what	  shows	  itself,	  the	  mystical.	  
Thus	  in	  ethical	  and	  religious	  language	  [and	  we	  might	  add	  as	  well,	  in	  the	  aesthetic	  language]	  
we	  seem	  constantly	  to	  be	  using	  similes.	  But	  a	  simile	  must	  be	  the	  simile	  for	  something.	  And	  if	  
I	   can	   describe	   a	   fact	   by	  means	   of	   a	   simile	   I	   must	   also	   be	   able	   to	   drop	   the	   simile	   and	   to	  
describe	  the	  facts	  without	  it.	  Now	  in	  our	  case	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  try	  to	  drop	  the	  simile	  and	  simply	  
to	  state	   the	   facts	  which	  stand	  behind	   it,	  we	   find	   that	   there	  no	  such	   facts.	  And	  so,	  what	  at	  
first	   appeared	   to	   be	   simile	   now	   seems	   to	   be	   mere	   nonsense.	   [...]	   I	   see	   now	   that	   these	  
nonsensical	   expressions	   were	   not	   nonsensical	   because	   I	   had	   not	   yet	   found	   the	   correct	  
expressions,	  but	  that	  their	  nonsensicality	  was	  their	  very	  essence.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1993]:	  43)	  	  
	  
5.	  When	  Wittgenstein	   gave	   his	   Lectures	   on	   Aesthetics	   many	   of	   his	   “old	   thoughts”	   on	  
logic,	   the	   meaning	   or	   philosophical	   method	   had	   already	   changed.	   Furthermore,	   his	  
problem	  in	  these	  lessons	  was	  not	  so	  much	  the	  statute	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art	  as	  the	  grammar	  
governing	   our	   aesthetic	   judgments	   or	   appreciations.	   And	   yet	   his	   “new	   thinking”	   on	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aesthetics	   keep	   in	   close	   “family	   resemblance”	   with	   those	   held	   in	   his	   youth.	   This	   is	   a	  
particular	  illustration	  of	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  his	  first	  and	  last	  philosophy.	  
Indeed,	   Wittgenstein	   maintains	   his	   critique	   of	   Platonism.	   Against	   what	   superficial	  
grammar	  tends	  to	  make	  us	  believe,	  given	  that	  “beautiful”	  is	  an	  adjective,	  we	  must	  resist	  
the	   temptation	   to	   understand	   the	   aesthetic	   judgments	   as	   ascribing	   a	   property	   to	  
something,	  the	  beauty,	  whose	  essence	  should	  unravel	  the	  philosophical	  research.	  
Moreover,	   the	   analogy	   between	  work	   of	   art	   and	   language	   remains.	   The	   same	  way	  
our	   linguistic	  expressions	  only	  make	  sense	   in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  way	  of	   life,	  the	  works	  of	  
art	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  against	  the	  background	  of	  a	  culture.	  
We	   could	   even	   say	   that,	   in	   a	   way,	   the	   “expressive”	   and	   “quasi-­‐tautological”	  
conception	  of	  the	  work	  of	  art	  we	  have	  seen	  assumed	  in	  his	  first	  thought,	  remains.	  The	  
works	   of	   art	   and	   the	   expressions	   of	   our	   language	   are	   subject	   to	   certain	   rules.	   These	  
rules,	  as	   the	  grammar	  of	  our	   linguistic	  expressions,	  are	  autonomous.	  They	  are	  not	   the	  
effect	  of	   any	  natural	  or	   super-­‐natural	   reality	   in	  our	  mind,	  but	   the	   result	  of	  our	  praxis,	  
shaping	  what	  we	  call	  a	  tradition.	  It	  is	  precisely	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  work	  to	  these	  rules	  what	  
we	  judge	  in	  our	  appraisals.	  When	  the	  adjustment	  seems	  to	  happen	  we	  experience	  a	  kind	  
of	   “click”,	   a	   satisfaction	  with	   the	  work	   that	   suddenly	   appears	   to	   us	   as	   coherent,	   as	   a	  
whole	  in	  which	  everything	  falls	  into	  place.	  
Obviously,	  the	  critique	  of	  reductionism	  and	  scientificism	  remains.	  Aesthetics	  is	  not	  a	  
branch	  of	  psychology	  or	  any	  other	  natural	  science.	  Understanding	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  to	  be	  in	  
the	   position	   to	   evaluate	   it	   aesthetically,	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   make	  
statistical	  assumptions	  about	  the	  reactions	  of	  approval	  or	  disgust	  caused	  in	  spectators.	  It	  
is,	  rather,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  practice	  an	  extraordinarily	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  activities	  that	  
have	   to	   do	   with	   the	   work,	   such	   as	   establishing	   comparisons,	   making	   analogies,	  
highlighting	  certain	  aspects	  of	  it...	  
But	  above	  all,	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  in	  this	  work	  for	  our	  interests	  is	  upheld,	  as	  we	  
noted	   at	   the	   beginning,	   the	   critique	   thesis	   of	   inexpressibility	   of	   aesthetics	   or	   of	   the	  
grammar	  of	  our	  aesthetic	  appreciations,	  more	  precisely.	  This	  is	  so,	  ultimately,	  because	  it	  
makes	  no	  sense	  to	  attempt	  to	  make	  a	  complete	  enumeration	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  make	  
us	  recognize	  a	  work	  as	  a	  suitable	  expression	  of	  a	  particular	  artistic	  culture.	  Among	  other	  
things,	   we	   could	   add	   and	   on	   our	   own,	   because	   as	   those	   who	   have	   reflected	   on	  
hermeneutic	  issues	  are	  well	  aware,	  our	  own	  critical	  practice	  helps	  shape	  that	  tradition,	  
so	  that	  this	  can	  never	  be	  declared	  concluded.	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Appendix:	  Count	  Eberhard’s	  Hawthorn	  
	  
Count	  Eberhard	  Rustle-­‐Beard, 	  
From	  Württemberg's	  fair	  land, 	  
On	  holy	  errand	  steer'd 	  
To	  Palestina's	  strand.	  
The	  while	  he	  slowly	  rode 	  
Along	  a	  woodland	  way; 	  
He	  cut	  from	  the	  hawthorn	  bush	  
A	  little	  fresh	  green	  spray.	  
Then	  in	  his	  iron	  helm	  
The	  little	  sprig	  he	  plac'd; 	  
And	  bore	  it	  in	  the	  wars, 	  
And	  over	  the	  ocean	  waste.	  
And	  when	  he	  reach'd	  his	  home;	  
He	  plac'd	  it	  in	  the	  earth; 	  
Where	  little	  leaves	  and	  buds 	  
The	  gentle	  Spring	  call'd	  forth.	  
He	  went	  each	  year	  to	  it, 	  
The	  Count	  so	  brave	  and	  true;	  
 And	  overjoy'd	  was	  he 	  
To	  witness	  how	  it	  grew.	  
The	  Count	  was	  worn	  with	  age	  
The	  sprig	  became	  a	  tree; 	  
'Neath	  which	  the	  old	  man	  oft	  
Would	  sit	  in	  reverie.	  
The	  branching	  arch	  so	  high, 	  
Whose	  whisper	  is	  so	  bland, 	  
Reminds	  him	  of	  the	  past 	  
And	  Palestina's	  strand.	  
	  
Ludwig	  Uhland	  (1787-­‐1862).	  	  
Translation	  by	  Alexander	  Platt,	  1848;	  quoted	  by	  Engelmann	  ([1967]:	  83-­‐84).	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